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of cordon pricing on and congestion 
pricing is obtained as a combination ofthe cordon location (i.e. distance ofthe cordむn
charged there that social amount 
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Cordon pricing is adopted most practices of road pricing to control area四widecongestion in註city
(e.g. Sing呂フ日 Kong，Osloフetc.)1. typical cordon pricing system is designed as follows: 
is charged a to1 it passes through specified cordon surrounding 
city where traffic is most congested. best pricing 
1S not an 
lS not 
and easy to 
easy フ
second 
this reasonヲitis cases are too 
or areas are too 
resource [15]ヲ
applicationsヲ





Urban economists developed lncorporatlng spatial 
1 Small and Gomez-Ibanez provide an overview of various practices of road pricing across the world. 
2 Recent paper de Palma and Lindsey considers the problem 
a tolled road in the network. they some interesting policy 
on artificial setIl班inthat a1 residents are located on a single circumference (same distance fro酷
-4-
discussed the discrepancy between equilibrium乱ndoptimalland use (e.g・ヲAnasand Xu [リラFujita[3]， 
Kanemoto [4]ラ Sullivan[12]). They showed that a congestion to1 (or location tax) internalizing 
congestion externalities should be charged to each resident to achieve the first四bestoptimal allocation. 
Congestion externalities vary depending on locations: the levels of to11s should be differenti抗edby 
residentiallocation. Obviouslyフtheimplementation of such a tolling policy is practically infeasibleヲ
so second best should considered instead. direction， Kanemoto focused on 
of how road capacity at each location should be determined in absence of昌
economlcsヲhoweverフconsidertwo extreme pricing 
no t01. 加 otherwordsフthesecond田bestpricing policies 
sufficient1yexplored3. Sullivan [1 [5] are exceptions. 
a best policy is proportional to 
S呂meas加eltax)ラ basedon general 
恥10stof 
spaむe
calculated τ。welfare gains vanous pnclng 
our 
of 
enables us to describe of resource 
誌tionsin a city. 
1S 0日
caseヲtolling we 















cordon pricing a 
ラ by 
levels no闘。to1
of parameter changes by 
cost 
Suppose昌linear where residential areas is located品t center (origin of coordinate) 
3 On the other handラthere exists extensive literature on second best pricing in non-spatial setting (e.g・ヲ Liu and 
McDonald [6]ラMarchand[7]ラVerhoef，et a1. 
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are developed around CBDフ l品ndarea of the is negligible 
residentiallocation is represented solely by distance from 












al xラ O~三 X 三 B ラ
residence to 














constant at al 
at x， 1S 
15 
to 
following， x yields 
(7) Qヤ)= -q(x) 
(7)， we obt呂inthe (4) relations (6) once more and incorporating Differentiating 
e号uatlonヲfol1owing 
bq"(x)十cq(x)= 0ヲ










?? ?C(O)=O; X 
んλ2are determined註S
。矧-aB)-冗
b( exp( aB) + exp( -αB)) ム
two 
ん=




an additional congestion externalities second term of the 
for first欄bestoptimum and e司UUJlVJ.A.U.LU under cordon 
< 0 and q" (x) > 0 also hold for these schemes 
as 
we From the 
-7 -
4As shown laterラdiferentiale弓uationsof甘iprate 
pricing have the same s佐uctureas E司.(8).百1USヲ
L 
x imposes on al drivers using road between x and o.τherefore (11) is consistent with the 









as at ラ asラ
こりl + 
y=侃間= 一








C(か f~~mt(Qi (y ) かf:屯。(y)知
Qo(Y) = I q;"'(z)dz 
戸rxm壬X豆β
Qi(Xm) = Qo(Xm) 
(16) 
7) 
by 7)， volume 
いのand(16) give two differential equations describing spatial variation ヲ these乱re
at to states 
X m 
As sect10nヲ weuse ニa-=1十cQ
rate 
q;*(x) =μje= + O~三 X~三 Xm ヲ
(x)ニμ3r十μ4eぽヲ 3Cm5三X<三Bラ




t(Qi(O)) = 0 
next by lS 
p(q~(xm)) = 了(xm)ー す
at the edge of the areaラ x=sラ
are asフ
constants to be 
-t(Qo(s))= O. 9d) 
above (19a)聞い9d)ラ constants are as 
-2土十2ae-aB十ずかα(B九)-e-α(B-ω} 














effects of exogenous changes cordon loc釦onand tolllevel on the e司uilibriumnumber of trips 
in each location are given as follows: 
oq汽X)
dxm 
くOラ forO g X52xmフ (21品)
-raeα(X+Xm 2aB .2α(B+xm) /)2ほ 2α(X+Xme 十 e~-  1_ e 十e




? o ~三 X 三;Xm I 
一 <0ラ Xm :S; X ~三 Bδ7 






註t x， (O:S; X云Xm) caused by品目
Xm to Xm十dら
一
o(y) _.1-. ， rB aIq:~ (y) 





second terms are negative from (21)， term lS 
makers located between X~__ and X 十 lncreasem m m 
q:希望(Xm) because they are to1 move. lncrease exceeds 
5 Rigorously speakingラthereis an exception: as shown later， the equilibrium number at Xm 
because it switches from qo (Xm) to qi (X m)ラand (Xm) < (Xm) as shown 
-10-
the sum ofthe trip decrease over alllocations6. When the cordon location moves outward， those who 
are exempt from the to1 due to this change are better off， while the others are worse of. 
we can treat this 
Figure 1 
品@
Optimal cordon pricing is combination ofthe cordon location xm and 




















? ?? -C(xwf 
Constraints to this problem are 
Note 
(15)-(17)ラi.e.， 間uilibrium pnclng. 
cordon pricing is solved 
9) into the objective 丘bove.














for 0 < x::; xm 
for xm < x ~ B 
E(x) is the sum of the congestion externality that an additional trip from x imposes on al drivers 
6 This is verified by expanding the RHS of Eq. (23)ラasfollows: 
α¥-eα(2B-x-xm) + eα(2B+x-xm) e α(X-Xm) + eα(計 Xm)






using road between X and 0 
The first line (24a) represents direct effect on social surplus caused by outward move of 
cordon location Xm: Increase consumers' surplus those are exempt the to1 minus 
decrease in revenue 7. Itis easil y seen sum 
caused by outward move 










? second of (24a) the sum of 
words， are considered as cl砲nges
describes 
amount of dead the 
has 




values 誌tleast， some locations between Xm 
Likewiseヲ term on has (15): 
丘tleast‘some loc説lons
1t turns out 
some 
Note 
x. lnus. onlV tne conn立urat10nas 2 is some x 
7 Note that outward move cordon location reduces the 
C(Xm). The first line of (24a) can be rewritten as follows: 
j山 C(Xm )q~ )l I f(xm) Lm-C(xJ
cost for those located at X__ from 
)+ず}此
Two bracketed terms are consumer for makers locatedjust inside and outside ofthe 
increase in consumer for those located at Xm・Thethird term Is the amount 
charged to a maker outside the cordon， which is foregone revenue due to move of the cordon 
location. 
8 Since = 0 from (15)， the bracketed term in the first integral on the line of 
becomes ラwhichis negative. And み~< 0 from (21a). Therefore， the first 
-12 
such that r -E(x) is positive between xm and王butnegative outside支
Figure 2 
on above discussionヲthesituations of resource allocation under cordon pricing for three 
typical locations are illustrated 3. C (x) + E( x) represents the social marginal costヲ i.e.，

















?? of are 
to as discussed above is areas to 






levels.9 as xm at 
increases cordon 
decrease in dead 
moves outw昌rd).
loss offset the losses lncrease 
sectlon 
















effects of cordon pricing on economic 
cordon pricing， no皿 equilibrium
values uSlng 
9 Note that increase in dead 10s means decrease in social surplus. 
? 。?
?
Osaka Prefecture， Japan， as followslO: 
B口 50，a = 130， b =498， C 口 0.52フ f=1.2.
Table 2 summarizes the result for these parameter values (shown as basic case). Optimal cordon 
location is 7.54 km 
amount of the 
the estimate 
surplus under three schemes， which品remeasured 
the and the 問問uivalentvalue ofthe optimal to1 is 29.42 minutes 
if we adopt 2000 for the which is 
of social 
soci丘l
[9]). The table also shows 
e司uivalentunits 11. 
surplus cordon than by 12%ヲ
by 0.7%. Although 1S a 























Note t由ha拡tpa紅rar臨neteぽrvalues are specified in the context of the model s鵠et柱ti問ngι:City i臼S 





Why does the cordon pricing produce such a good result as shown above? Let us investigate in 
more detail the workings of cordon pricing as a device to control congestion externality. Note thatヲas
seen in Eq. (25)ヲcongestionexternality depends on traffic volume at each location that is integral of 
trips originating in outer locations. Fig. 6 plots tr計五cvolumes Q(x) for no四to1 equilibrium， 
first叩bestoptimum and cordon pricing. By definition (Eq. (3))ヲtrafficvolume at the edge ofthe urb品目
area， BラlSe司ualto zero al cases， and the (negative) slope of each curve is equal to rate 
originating at each locationフ q(x).
Figure 6 
figure shows that the volume curve for the cordon pricing closely curve for 
first-best optimum， and two curves cross twice at intermediate locations. 
trips are 叩pricedin locations inside 
under四priced the fringe of area. Accordinglyヲ









cordon pricing is steeper inside 
to1s are at only one 
rate 
皿best.
zone volume to 
This paper presents a simple spatial model of traffic congestion a monocentric 
of cordon pricing on 開makingand congestion level in each 
to lnvest1gate 
cordon 
pricing is obtained as a combination ofthe cordon loc乱 (i.e.distance cordon the CBD) 
and the amount of to1 charged that maxImizes the total social surplus a city. Under the 
optimal cordon pricingヲtripsfrom locations inside cordon are under-pricedラthosejust outside the 
cordon are over-priced and those the fringe urban area are under田priced. Numerical 
simulations using parameter values based on J apおlesedata suggest that the cordon pricing attains 
組 economicwelfare level very close to the first-best optimum. 
This paper introduces a number of assumptions to simplify the analysis. The most restrictive one is 
that the city is monocentric: All trips are destined to CBD. Ifthis assumption is relaxedヲtheresult 
? ??
?
long-開 neffects. Since trips de拠点目gat locations inside the cordon are to11sヲ central
that cordon pricing attains good performance m註ybe modified significantly. In this caseヲitmight be 
necessary to introduce multiple cordons. should also consider the land use ch乱ngeto see the 
locations become more attractive cordon pricing. This induces land use st印 cturewith higher 
density locationsラ 1S to have positive impacts on efficiency. shown 
city models with congestion， efficiency is 
more comp丘ct(e. gラ












?????? ?? we to on 





3 品企 use Slzeラ
1989. 
4. Kanemotoヲ Urban 1980. 
12 Kraus takes into account this cost in numerical analysis. 
??
from Survey i日 1990ラ include 
5. Kr昌usヲ welfaregains from pricing road congestion using automatic vehicle identification 
and orトvehiclemetersフJour問 101 Urban Economicsヲ25(1989) 261-281 
6.L.N. ラEconomicefficiency of second-best congestion pricing schemes in u出品目
highway ラ升ansportationResearch， s， 33 (1999) 157問団8.
7. note on optimal an 36 968) 
575由581.

















information of origin， destination and travel time for each individu品1trip on a given day. d丘taare 
aggregated by 67 jurisdictions in Osaka prefectur久 andthen the number of trips from each 
jurisdiction to the (defined as 品目dChu皿 O四kuof Osaka City) is extracted. Aggregated 
are divided by populations of jurisdictions to obtain number person. 
centers of jurisdictions to 
are B， a， b， c， and f 
are measured on 
呂metersto 
明reassu日le distance areaラ is 50 of to 
of Osak丘area(孔
(Nose Cho) is 39 away. 
59 lS 
as 





c. context x. 
zone 1 to フc)ラ 1S by 
ヲc)江戸i十cf:i Q(y)砂
lS sum ofs司uareerrors lS C 1S so 
travel i. It follows that c = 0.52. 
。 。??
ofx 












case Larger b Smaller c 
b in 498 748 498 
c m cost 0.52 0.52 0.26 
7.54 km 8.32 km 8.78 
to1 29.42 min 25.63抽出 22.65 
233.5臨m 184.6 min 30ヲ.0
263.4拙in(l 201.0臨時(l 329.2 




O B Xm 
rates 
21-
O Xm X B 
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0.25 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.3 0.35 0.4 
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as urb品目 st悶 ctureis closer to 
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Urban Economics Workshop in ラ Micro
Economics Workshop in KyotoラandInternational Symposium on the Theory and Practice of Congestion Charging 
in We thank Takanori IdaラTatsuhikoN ariuラAgachaiSumaleeラTakatoshiTabuchiラHaiYangラandthe 
participants of workshops for valuable comments. We are also grateful to Gen圃enNishimura for helping with 
computer works.τhe仕ipsurvey data were provided by Keihanshin Transport Planning Councilラ andKiyoshi 
Kobayashi helped in data usesラ whichare gratefully acknowledged. This research was supported by a 
Grant叩幽Aidfor Scientific Research (No. 13630008) from the Ministry ofEducation and Scienceラ
Corresponding author 
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congestion an urban area. It was reported that implementations some as 
recent years has been increasing cordon pricing as a measure to control 
Singapore Norwegian cities (Oslo， Bergen， were success良11. makers 
cities suffering heavy congestlon now as a policy 
cordon situation induced works aiming to evaluate 
むrdevelop methods to obtain optimal design 
(2000)， SantosヲNewberうら Rojey (2000)ラ (2002)， 
pricing system (e. g.フ
works 
are mainly based on modelsラwithwhich results depend on network structure for 
they not discuss of use structure Santosラ
Newbery， Rojey (2000) calculate the optimal cordon tolls for eight 
effects of cordon pricing are considerably different among eight towns. ln 
the effectiveness should be 
among cities. It is worth 
to network st印 ctures
effects of these ぬctorson 
policies idealized setting， such as continuous space models in 
Kanemoto (1980)， SuUivan (1983)， Fujit品(1989)ラKraus(1989)， Anas and 
(e.g.ラ
(1999)). 
Yoshikawa (2003) investigate of on urban 
sp拭ial of monocentric city， and show that the cordon pricing attains an 
level very close to 問bestoptimum 2. The system works as follows: under 









trips from loc拭ionsinside the cordon are under皿pricedヲthosejust outside 






trip rate in each zone to minimize the deviation of traffic volume the 立lodelis 
based on a number of assumptions to obtain an品lyticalsolution: linear demandラ density， 
uniform road capacityヲetc. It is unclear how relaxing these assumptions affect results. 
This paper extends the analysis to deal with the situation in丘non-monocentrIccity. Unlike 
monocentric city where al trips are destined to CBD， trips may occur between any pairs of 
loc拡lonsln a norト.monocentriccity. We develop a model to describe spatial distribution of trip 
1 London started congestion charge in the central area in 2003. The system is “Area pricingラ"which is similar 
but different to cordon pricing. 







C(民y)is time cost for a 
ryj Q(z) i 
C(x，y)= r tl一一一 Id
Jx ~ ) 











to drive unit distance around location zヲ




respect to traffic volume幽 capacity悶tio. Traffic volume is the sum trips passing location z 








route X to IS 
at a to r lS 
1S 
x，y 
















whereXis of good that does not involve 
located in y. The above 
Utility 
loca鵠din x makes to 
as he/she visit 
1= 十 f~B ω y， the 
(5 ヲy，j)iP(X，y)= ~ I ~\--'J'J/ I 
o a 
Since the specification (i) that the destinations in y are e中







d = 24500ヲ g
lS as 
品rea/ 
as k = 0.24フ V
as a 
lS to to 
to 
to zero 
center to lS to 50 
むase
to 
base c品seフ itis 一 case lS as 
Xm 13 すこご lヲ
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to are a 
center. 
at 
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fr~ 0 ~ 弘之c;s
上の条件は、下記のように形式的に書き表される。
cム-c;とo (5a) 
































subject to (6)(7) 
最適化の 1階条件より、次の関係が導かれる。


































to 才一三三Oヲ aE 
。ヲ a~
ここにτ フ九一ヲずIJであり、 Hは課金するリンクの集合(ただし cA)である O また

















るリンク は、 = 1，2，..に分けられ、それぞれは臨番目のコ
ードンラインを横切るリンクの集合に対応する。そして丸に含まれるすべてのリンクでは
同額の料金 される。
制御変数 金三 へと 次元
λ;f 




































? ?? ?、??????。，? (17) 
ここにλは自由走行状態でリンク aを通過するのに要する はリンク aの交通容量
である O ここでは土木学会の交通需要予測小委員会が標準的な値として提案している、
v = 0.48ラ r= 2.82を用いることとするO
需要関数は次式のように特定化する o
Drs(Crs) αnr Hsむ均(-β Crs) (18) 



















路に含まれるリンクの集合である。なお時間価値 W は 80円/分@台を仮定するO これは
で用いられた値である。
需要関数のパラメータ推定結果は次の通りである。
a = 0.000024 (15.0503) 
Bs 0.6055 (10.2505) 0.5430 










































































































議会トリッ 2 7 7 2. 1 弘 2 -13. 弘 2.080.653 3. 92弘
時) 1号 2. 弘 18，316， -19.62弘 17 4.877 -23.58弘
1， 217， 2 5舗 897 28弘 810 -35. 96弘
9. 9. 弘 8.81 -6. 弘 8.37 1. 22弘
田fllf olJ ti可嘗~ . 2 8 s 4.31弘 5 -25. 61弘
己仏)l 537 
、も"-;;:t:t吋ザ.A..::x:ユ.1 (1 2 2 91弘 2 3. 弘 2.514 -15.80弘
(1 号 1. 117 
2 3 9.88% 3 5 14. 弘 3. 631 21.64弘
G 弘 弘 646 69.52弘
表-4 3重コードンのもとで上位の料金案に関する結果
2 3 4 5 
コードン料金 200 200 200 300 300 
コードン料金 300 200 300 200 200 
コード 900 900 800 900 800 
総トリッ (台) 1.909.297 1.955.271 1，940，314 1，917，478 1， 949， 301 
15，526，012 16.068.349 15.972.431 15. 628. 140 16.077.300 
913 701. 517 699. 647 677， 936 707，398 
亡。刀1 
トリツ 時) 8.13 8. 8. 8.15 8.25 
(分) .5 .6 21.2 21.8 
704 716 742 705 
(1 再) 2.309 2.368 2. 354 2.319 2， 367 
(1 1.390 1，423 1，374 
(1 円) 3， 3. 745 3. 743 3. 742 3，741 
(1 756 755 
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